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Abstract
NIMBY (not in my backyard) is the word used to describe the human behavior
whereby a person agrees on an issue but refuses to accept it when it happens `in his
own back yard'. This paper analyzes this type of NIMBY activity and, using evidence
from England's waste management policy, determines that NIMBY decisions are not
necessarily the result of personal self-interest. If people disagree with building a
nuisance facility, such as a site for waste and recyclables, in their own backyard, the
result is an increase in illegal dumping rather than the legal and proper disposal of
waste materials at an ocial facility. Using the spatial econometrics approach, we
further provide evidence that the broken window theory is also applicable to illegal
dumping.
Key Words: Illegal Dumping, Spatial Econometrics, Waste Management, NIMBY
problem
1 Introduction
Waste is and has always been a general byproduct of human life, and though waste ma-
terials surround us, they have not been considered a devastating pollution problem until
recently. The status of waste materials and their impact on the environment, however,
began to change with the onset of the era of mass production and consumption. Consider,
for example, that each household is lled with electric devices and toxic chemicals, most
of which are very costly and dicult to dispose of in a proper manner. While waste is
one of the major sources of pollution in our society, the greatest pollution from waste is
caused by illegal dumping. Consequently, the proper disposal of waste versus the illegal
dumping of waste is one of the great concerns for many countries.
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The USEPA (1998), for instance, addresses concerns about the illegal disposal of
wastes and its impact on human health. Harmful uids or dust generated by wastes can
be harmful to people, especially children, who are often more vulnerable to physical and
chemical hazards. In addition, the USEPA (1998) mentions the higher risks associated
with the prevalence of mosquitoes that thrive in the stagnant waters found in scrap
tires and waste dumps, as these insects carry severe diseases, such as dengue fever and
encephalitis. In addition to the aforementioned risks of severe health problems, illegal
dumping can also result in spontaneous combustion, which leads to property damage and
possible neighborhood evacuations, and runos from the dump site, which often become
the source of pollution in drinking water.
From the cost perspective, the impact of illegal dumping can also be quite substantial.
The UK Environment Agency reports that \[i]t is estimated to cost $100-$150 million
every year to investigate and clear up" illegal dumping.1 According to the Japanese
Ministry of the Environment, a clean-up cost for one of the worst dump sites located on
the border of the Aomori and Iwate prefectures is estimated to be 598 million Euro. In
response to these situations, several countries are beginning to reexamine their regulations
with respect to illegal dumping and are introducing more stringent rules and/or penalties
for waste crimes. The UK's Defra, for example, has just launched tougher penalties
against waste crimes, such as illegal dumping,2 while within the last decade, the Japanese
government has repeatedly strengthened penalties for waste crimes as dened in the
Waste Disposal and Public Cleansing Law.
Despite the impact of illegal dumping, the economics literature on the subject is rather
limited. Among others, Sigman (1998), which examined the illegal dumping of used oil
in the United States, is considered the seminal work in the eld of illegal dumping. Our
study, however, is much like Kim et al. (2008), who empirically examined the illegal
dumping by households.3 Kim et al. (2008) argued that illegal dumping was induced
1http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/homeandleisure/waste/flytipping/37851.aspx
2See the news release (http://www.defra.gov.uk/news/2008/080613a.htm) on July 13, 2008 for de-
tails.
3Apart from the empirical study, there are several theoretical studies that focus on illegal dumping,
such as Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995).
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by the introduction of unit pricing of municipal solid waste in South Korea, and they
concluded that authorities must, therefore, be careful about increasing unit prices.
Our research is motivated by Ichinose and Yamamoto (2011), who insisted that one of
the main factors that induces illegal dumping is the shortage of proper waste treatment
facilities. Accordingly, the present paper focuses on the consequences of the shortage
of proper waste treatment facilities. Waste is generated in every household every day,
regardless of the capacity of the waste treatment facilities, and this waste must be dis-
posed of because it is not practical to keep it in the house for a number of reasons (e.g.,
unpleasant odor and lack of sucient space). Our hypothesis is that legally avoiding the
construction of a nuisance facility may reduce concerns regarding the negative impact
on the aesthetics of the area but does not necessarily reduce other serious environmental
eects, such as those from another illegal activity, such as illegal dumping. We posit that
limiting the legal way to dispose of waste simply forces the proper disposal of certain
wastes into illegal dumps. To verify this hypothesis, we introduce the theoretical result
of Ichinose and Yamamoto (2011) and develop an econometric model.
Our second hypothesis is that there is a spatial correlation of y tipping among local
authorities. This type of spatial dependence is called the broken windows theory. As
the USEPA (1998) states,“ Dump sites serve as magnets for additional dumping and
other criminal activity”, a practice that is not new or uncommon. To the best of our
knowledge, however, there is no statistical evidence available in the existing literature to
support the USEPA's statement. To provide objective validity of the broken windows
theory for illegal dumping, we use a spatial econometric approach.
Finally, the third hypothesis to be veried is that the less frequent collection of waste
and recyclables increases illegal dumping. This notion is motivated by Abbott et. al
(2011), who found evidence that“ the lower the frequency of collection of residual waste,
the higher the recycling rate.”Considering whole waste management, there is a concern
that disutility caused by lower collection frequency could promote more illegal dumping
if the frequency of the waste collection is reduced to promote a higher recycling rate.
Thus, we attempt to verify whether the less frequent collection of residual waste actually
3
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promotes illegal dumping. If so, the naive introduction of a less frequent collection policy
must pay an unforeseen cost at the other end.
In the next section, we describe the simple economic model, and in Section 3, we
explain the spatial econometric issues addressed in this paper. In Section 4, we present
the data and estimated results along with the policy implications. Finally, in Section 5,
we oer concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Suppose that there are k identical households that discharge waste4. Each household
generates G amount of waste that must be disposed of. Once the waste is handed over to
a disposing rm, it can be disposed of using an appropriate treatment process (denoted
by L). The other choice is that a household dumps the waste illegally (= illegal dumping
or y tipping). The amount of illegal dumping is denoted by mI, which represents the
number of illegal dumpings (m) and the xed amount of waste dumped per number of
dumpings (I). We assume that it costs cL to properly dispose of the waste and cI to
illegally dump mI amount of waste. Here, cL includes the cost for the oensive smell or
the cost for the space to keep the waste until collection, which, in some cases, only occurs
once over a two-week period. Alternatively, cL could represent the cost for a household
member to take the waste to the dumping site. In what follows, we assume that cL
denotes the lowest cost for the aforementioned options.
Furthermore, we assume that illegal dumping would be punished if detected. Let
p(mI) with p0 > 0; p00 > 0 be the probability of the environmental authority detecting
the illegal dumping. Then, household i faces the following problem:
min
Li;mi
cLLi + cImiI + p(miI)F; (1)
s.t. Li +miI = G; (2)
where F denotes the ne for illegal dumping. By minimizing (1) with the constraint, we
4The following model is based on Ichinose and Yamamoto (2011).
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obtain the demand function for the proper treatment of waste as follows:
cL   cI   p0(G  Li)F = 0 (3)
Let Ldi be the household's demand for legal waste treatment; then, from (3), each
household's demand function can be written as Ldi = l(cL; cI ; G; F ). Because we suppose
that all rms are identical, the total demand for legal waste treatment is
kX
i=1
Ldi = kl(cL; cI ; G; F ): (4)
If we now consider the disposing rms, each rm is also assumed to have the same
supply function for the waste treatment service. That is, Lsj = fj(cL), where j is the
indicator for each disposing rm. We assume that fj() is twice dierentiable and that its
rst derivative is positive. As all of the disposing rms are homogeneous, the aggregate
supply function can be written as follows:
nX
j
Lsj=1 = nfj(cL): (5)
where n is the number of disposing rms. At equilibrium,
P
i L
d
i =
P
j L
s
j must be
satised. That is,
kl(cL; cI ; G; F )  nf(cL) = 0; (6)
must be met. Remember that our motivation is to analyze the relationship between
illegal dumping and the provision of waste treatment sites. To focus on this relationship,
we assume that k = 1. Let M denote the total number of illegal dumpings, namely,
M(n; cI ; G; F ) 
P
im(n; cI ; G; F ). We then have the following results
5:
dM
dn
=
X
i
dmi
dn
< 0 (7)
dM
dcI
=
X
i
dm
dcI
< 0 (8)
An increase in the number of waste treatment facilities (= n) decreases the number of
illegal dumpings. This result is closely related to (8), which conrms that a higher cost
of illegal dumping decreases the number of illegal dumpings.
5For the derivation process, see the appendix of Ichinose and Yamamoto (2011).
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While illegal dumping could lead to one of the worst environmental pollution hazards
due to its waste discharge, we expect no direct environmental damage from ocial waste
treatment facilities. While there may be some indirect eects on property value or on
the image of the communities where the facilities were built, the cost for the facilities
was less than that of illegal dumping, which could result, in the worst-case scenario,
in health problems. Nevertheless, communities often refuse to allow a waste and/or
recycling treatment facility. We should note that this overreaction and refusal to allow a
waste treatment site is not necessarily in the best own interest of the community.
Based on the results presented, we attempt to verify these theoretical results by
applying econometric inference.
3 Econometric Specication
We rst consider our hypotheses that there would be broken-window-theory-type behav-
ior for illegal dumping. If so, there will be a bias when we apply the OLS method in
our empirical analysis. We rst determine whether there is any spatial dependency in
the event of illegal dumping using Moran's I and the Lagrange multiplier test6. In this
paper, we explore two types of spatial specications: the spatial lag model and spatial
error model.
Suppose that there exist N regions in the data. The spatial lag model is
yi = 0 + w
L
i + 1xi + i; (9)
where the parameter  is a spatial autocorrelation coecient, and wLi is ith element of
Wy. Note that W is N N spatial weight matrix dened below and that y is a vector of
our dependent variables, that is, the number of illegal dumpings that occurred in a local
authority. We also assume that i is independently and identically distributed.
The other specication is the spatial error model, in which the spatial eect is derived
through the error terms as follows:
yi = 0 + 1xi + i (10)
6See Anselin (2006) for detail.
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where
i = w
E
i + i: (11)
As in the spatial lag model, wEi is the ith element in vector W, and the i values are
also assumed to be independent and identically distributed.
If the normality on the pure error term is satised, both models could be estimated
using the maximum likelihood (ML) method. Unfortunately, the Jarque Bera tests for
normality in both models conclude that the normality is not satised in our data; there-
fore, we no longer use the ML method. Rather, we apply the GM method, developed
by Kelejian and Prucha (1999), to estimate the spatial lag model above, and we use the
generalized two-stage least-squares method, developed by Kelejian and Prucha (1998),
to estimate the spatial error model7.
With respect to the spatial weight matrix (SWM), we apply two dierent SWMs to
verify robustness. One is an SWM based on the queen-type contiguity, which considers
any two local authorities as neighbors if the two local authorities share any boundary
point. The other SWM considers distance-based neighbors, which assigns neighbors based
on a specied distance. In this paper, the specied distance is the maximum dierence
between any two local authorities. With this denition, we have no local authority that
has zero neighbors.
Figure 1 is the comparison of the links among neighbors in two dierent SWMs.
As can be observed, the number of neighbors substantially increases in the SWM with
respect to distance-based neighbors. Considering the nature of household behavior, we
place greater emphasis on the queen-type contiguity when arguing the empirical results.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Data
Our data for this research are collected from three databases. The data on y tipping in
England are from the database called Flycapture, on which local authorities record the
details when they nd an incident of y-tipping. Flycapture data are publicly accessible
7These methods are available in spdep package in R. See chapter 10 of Bivand et al. (2008) for further
information on computation issues.
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Figure 1: Comparison of two spatial weight matrix (above: Queen Type, below: Distance
based
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and easy to download from the DEFRA website. In this database, the number of y-
tipping occurrences in each local authority is available. We use the data from 2010 to
2011 (the total number of occurrences in a year in each local authority).
We only use the most recent year's data because a breakdown of the y-tipping data is
only available for this year. In other years' data, we do not specify the ratio of household
y tipping in a local authority. We believe that this breakdown is critical because the
behavioral mechanisms behind the household and industry are dierent. Mixing y
tipping by household and by industry could mislead us to an inappropriate conclusion.
As our interest is on household activity, we only use the data on household y tipping.
The second data source is Waste Data Flow8. All of the waste-related data except
y tipping are collected from this database. In addition, data on population, household
and the deprivation index were also taken from this database. We use the data from the
rst quarter (January to March) of 2010 because there is likely to be a lag between an
illegal dumping and its detection. Thus, we assume that the average time lag between
the illegal disposal and the actual detection of y tipping is half a year.
The last data source is the ONS shapele data, which provide us with polygon les9.
These data are indispensable for drawing a map at the level of the local authorities in
the UK. As the polygon data contain information on borders, we can create a spatial
weight matrix based on these data. In addition to creating a map, the area data that we
use are also collected from this database.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our data. In Table 1, FThw is the number
of y tippings by household in each local authority during one year. DEFRA states that
“ ytipping is the common term used to describe waste illegally deposited on land as
described under section 33 of the Environment Protection Act 1990.”For the purposes
of recording on Flycapture, DEFRA also states that“waste should be counted as a ytip
if it is too large to be removed by a normal hand-sweeping barrow.”Figure 2 is a plot of
FThw. Each dot on the map represents a local authority and corresponds to a dot on the
graph. The emphasis on the rst quadrant indicates the local authority with a higher
8This database is available at http://www.wastedataflow.org/.
9These data are available at http://www.ordnancesurvey.co.uk
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
n mean sd min max
FThw 323 1588 3705 61.00 50027
ActionT 323 1755 3290 0.00 36548
hw 323 8449 6444 0.00 57142
pop 323 157741 105724 8000 1010200
HH 323 65034 43283 5000 399000
Area 323 40837 56132 314.94 507835
DI 323 18.86 9.29 4.17 49.78
SiteT 323 61.51 66.45 0.00 534.00
WCF 323 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
RCF 323 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
Source: Flycapture, Waste Data Flow and ONS data base
See main text for the explanation of variables.
level of illegal dumping in the local authority as well as the level of illegal dumping in
the neighboring local authorities. It seems there is more y tipping around the larger
cities, but this may be because lower income households live near larger cities. To fully
understand the spatial dependency of y tipping, we must control any other eect as
much as possible by introducing the proper variables.
One of these variable is ActionT, which is the number of actions taken by various
local authorities against y tipping in the previous year. This includes all of the recorded
actions from simply leaving a warning to actual prosecution. In the empirical work, the
number of actions taken divided by the total incidents (ActionR) is used. The total
number of tons of waste collected from each local authority is denoted as HW, while SiteT
denotes the total number of bring sites for wastes and recyclables10. In the empirical
model, we use the total number of bring sites divided by the area (perST).
For waste collection, we use two variables. One is WCF, which is the dummy variable
taking a value of one if the household waste is collected fortnightly or less often and a
wheeler bin is small (10 to 150 little). The other variable is RCF, which takes a value of
one if recyclables are collected fortnightly or less often and the recycling bin is less than
50 little.
10The recognition as NIMBY facility would be higher for other larger facilities like incinerators and
landll sites than the bring site. We, however, believe the bring site still has some negative externality
eect for us and could be considered as nuisance facility for some residence.
10
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Figure 2: Fly Tipping in England (2010-11, household waste)
Source: Flycapture and ONS database 11
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In addition to the waste-related variables, we use the following socio-economic vari-
ables: Area for the area of each local authority in hectares, pop for the population of each
local authority, and DI for the deprivation index score (2010) in each local authority.
4.2 Estimation Results
Table 2 shows the estimated results for the case with queen-type contiguity. First, the
LM test result (LMlag and LMerr) based on OLS residuals supports the spatial lag model
with 5% signicance. Table 3 also shows almost all of the same results, though with a
little weaker signicance for a few of the variables. As the queen-type SWM is more
likely to express household behavior, we concentrate on the results in Table 2.
Table 2: Estimated Results with queen type contiguity
OLS Spatial Lag Model Spatial Error Model
Variable Coecient (Std. Err.) Coecient (Std. Err.) Coecient (Std. Err.)
HW 0.454496 (0.072232 ) 0.424274 (0.279459) 0.444411 (0.071404)
ActionR -0.530163 (0.133942) -0.537529 (0.141959) -0.530883 (0.131745)
perST -4.502780 (2.770194) -4.483593 (2.066723) -4.529023y (2.730648)
WCF 0.002196 (0.109930) 0.045334 (0.096704) 0.014129 (0.108625)
RCF -0.257397y (0.140666) -0.234532y (0.127947) -0.253573y (0.138691)
popden 0.039168 (0.054487) 0.065435 (0.072717) 0.053042 (0.054492)
DI 1.437075 (0.108963) 1.402421 (0.153520) 1.423884 (0.107379)
Intercept -1.374552 (0.593404) -4.079338 (1.614520) -1.281286 (0.588024)
 - - 0.468057 (0.193016) - -
 - - - - 0.16337 (1.1427)
LMerr 0.4722
RLMerr 1.3242
LMlag 4.9778

RLMlag 5.8297

** 1% * 5% y10%
N 323 323 323
R2 0.517 - -
F 50.31 - -
The results of the LM tests suggest that we must consider the spatial dependence
and focus on the result of the middle of the spatial lag model. As the coecient of the
spatial lag (= ) is also signicant and positive, our hypothesis that the broken window
theory is applicable to illegal dumping is conrmed. Note that we control the income
level with the deprivation index even though there is still a spatial dependency among
local authorities, which is robust evidence that one y tipping event could certainly lead
to another y tipping event.
With respect to the hypothesis on collection frequency, the results are ambiguous in
12
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Table 3: Estimated Results with distance based contiguity
OLS Spatial Lag Model Spatial Error Model
Variable Coecient (Std. Err.) Coecient (Std. Err.) Coecient (Std. Err.)
HW 0.454496 (0.072232 ) 0.400554 (0.276542) 0.430717 (0.071497)
ActionR -0.530163 (0.133942) -0.595235 (0.150469) -0.554512 (0.130844)
perST -4.502780 (2.770194) -3.468262y (1.881782) -4.450508 (2.768791)
WCF 0.002196 (0.109930) 0.061672 (0.095788) 0.017240 (0.108040)
RCF -0.257397y (0.140666) -0.273400 (0.125857) -0.278180 (0.138602)
popden 0.039168 (0.054487) 0.058600 (0.071283) 0.055460 (0.055034)
DI 1.437075 (0.108963) 1.379371 (0.138355) 1.433877 (0.108496)
Intercept -1.374552 (0.593404) -2.656859y (1.476381) -1.179486 (0.589288)
 - - 0.294735y (0.15677) - -
 - - - - 0.11402 (0.20213)
LMerr 1.7391
RLMerr 0.4096
LMlag 4.8522

RLMlag 3.5227
y
** 1% * 5% y10%
N 323 323 323
R2 0.517 - -
F 50.31 - -
that waste collection is not signicant, whereas the collection frequency of recyclables is
signicant and negative. According to the former nding, we could say that collection fre-
quency is not relevant to illegal dumping, while from the latter result, we could conclude
that illegal dumping is reduced when recyclables are collected on a more frequent basis.
As Abbott et. al (2011) show, the decreasing collection frequency of waste increases the
recycling rate. In other words, we can conclude from this result that reducing waste
collection frequency does not promote illegal dumping. This nding is contrary to our
hypothesis, though it yields better results when we consider a whole waste management
policy because a policy that attempts to increase the recycling rate does not negatively
impact the attempt to reduce illegal dumping.
Finally, the results show that the coecient of perST is signicant and negative, sug-
gesting that illegal dumping increases if there is not a sucient number of waste/recyclable
treatment facilities in a local authority. From our perspective, the results suggest that
people who adopt the NIMBY behavior must pay the price from the other end. Refusing
to allow a waste/recyclable treatment site generates illegal dumping“in your back yard”.
This evidence is important as policy makers attempt to persuade those communities that
are opposed to the building of a treatment facility.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that NIMBY activity does not always benet one's self-interests
as it relates to y tipping in England. Legally avoiding the construction of a nuisance
facility may reduce concerns about the community's positive image, but it does not
necessarily reduce other serious environmental eects from illegal activity, such as y
tipping. Policy makers and ordinary citizens should keep this in mind so that NIMBY-
type behaviors do not cause further environmental damage.
We also revealed that there is a spatial correlation regarding the number of y tipping
events in local authorities, even after controlling for income levels in each local authority.
This nding indicates that the broken window theory is applicable to illegal dumping.
An earlier and eective measure against illegal dumping is the key to minimizing the
costs associated with illegal dumping because illegal dumping produces more and more
illegal activity once it prevails.
14
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